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IN THE SUPREME COUR 1~ 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL KANO and I 
TOMMY SEO, 
Pla.intiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.- r 
I 
ARCON CORPORATION and \ 
BARCON CORPORATION, ( 
Utah corporations, 
and MAE L. BAGLEY, LEO L. \ 
CAPSON, GLEN L. PECK and 
MANFORD A. SHAW, 
Defendarnts and Appellan.ts. 
Case 
No. 8739 
BRIEF O·F APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents brought suit to recover money damages 
for crop loss, to restrain appellants from interfering with 
respondents' water and water rights, and to require ap-
pellants to restore the flow of water from underground 
wells and springs. The appellants are two separate cor-
porations and four individuals. 
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The trial court entered a money judgment against all 
of the appellants in the amount of $8,217.36 and ordered 
them to install an electric pumping system and to per-
petually pump three cubic feet of water per second for 
the plaintiffs during the irrigation season. From this 
judgment all of the defendants have appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents are the owners of approximately twen-
ty-five acres of land situated near 5600 South and 20th 
East in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 146) The appellant 
Arcon Corporation purchased a 56-acre tract of land 
from Henry Moyle. (R. 354.) In total, the Moyle farm 
had a water right approximately two and one-half times 
greater than it needed. (R. 319-20) The land having 
been purchased for subdivision purposes, the irrigation 
water was taken off the land and the stock sold to Salt 
Lake City Corporation. (R. 355) Considerable other land 
on the east toward the foothills had also been subdivided 
over the past years, and taken out of irrigation. (R. 
298-99) 
Appellant Arcon Corporation also purchased some 
land from Salt Lake City Corporation. This land abutted 
the east boundary of respondents' land, separating it 
from the Moyle farm, and, prior to its acquisition by the 
City, had been O\vned by a man named Ferguson. (R. 
354-55). Ferguson utilized runoff water from upper irri-
gation and \Vaters naturally accumulating in a source 
known as Spring Run Creek to develop some fish ponds. ~:~ 
Spring Run Creek was a surface stream and was covered, 
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though generally, by a court decree. (R. 295-97) The 
area embraced in the Ferguson and Moyle farms was 
marshy and swampy, as shown on official topographical 
maps. (Exhibits 3-D and 3-D [a]) Moyle had a large pond 
on his place which was upstream both from Ferguson and 
respondents. Historically, this pond had filled with water 
from Spring Run Creek, but at the time appellant Arcon 
Corporation purchased the Moyle farm, this pond had 
gone dry. (R. 349) 
There was not sufficient water from Spring Run 
Creek for the fish ponds constructed by Ferguson and, to 
augment this flow, he drilled approximately 25 wells, all 
of which flowed under artesian pressure. (R. 279) The 
combined waters flowing to the Spring Run channel from 
the Moyle farm and the farms above it, from natural 
sources, and from the 25 wells, were sufficient to maintain 
these fish ponds. The fish ponds were operated until just 
prior to the time they were filled in for subdivision pur-
poses. (R. 358-60) 
In about 1894 one of respondents' predecessors in 
interest, a man named Boyce, learned that Ferguson was 
contsructing a fish pond in the middle of his acreage 
(R. 258). Boyce went to Ferguson and said "Why can't 
I use some of that water?" Ferguson said it would be 
all right, and a ditch was built jointly by Ferguson and 
Boyce from what is referred to in the record as the middle 
pond. (R. 257-59) This ditch took water from a pond by 
gravity to respondents' land and was used for irrigation 
purposes. 
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In about 1904 Ferguson constructed a lower pond 
near the westerly or downstream edge of his property. (R. 
275) This pond was built entirely by Ferguson to serve 
fish culture purposes, and respondents' predecessors did 
not participate in any way in the construction of this 
lower pond. (R. 275) 
Sometime between 1912 and 1920, the exact date could 
not be fixed by the witnesses, respondents' predecessor 
abandoned the ditch from the middle pond and started 
diverting water from the lower pond. (R. 275-76) The 
lower pond raised the elevation of the water several feet, 
so that water could be diverted from it by gravity to the 
lands now owned by respondents. From about 1912 until 
the times complained of here, respondents' land received liiy. 
water from the lower pond by gravity flow. The acreage 
irrigated during this time was substantially less than 
that now irrigated by respondents, since the testimony 
reveals that the quantity of water historically used was 
very small. Bagley, who sold the land to respondents, 
testified that he didn't irrigate his alfalfa at all. (R. 359) 
The acreage that was irrigated by Bagley was no more 
than four acres. (R. 341) 
When respondents changed the use of the land to 
row crops (subsequent to 1944), they began using con-
siderably more water. There was no testimony fixing the 
('xact amount of water used, but respondent Seo said 
!w.,: 
"Wll. 
they never used more than between one and two cubic ~: 
fpd per second. (R. 155) 
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During 1955, Salt Lake City bought the Ferguson 
tract. (R. 355) It shut off the 25 flowing wells and drilled 
a 20-inch replacement well to greater depth. The water 
from the 20-inch well was taken into the City culinary sys-
tem. Respondents brought suit against Salt Lake City 
Corporation, claiming that it wrongfully shut off the 25 
wells and wrongfully took from the plaintiffs the water 
yielded by the wells. In that suit, the District Court of 
Salt Lake County decided the issues in favor of Salt Lake 
City and respondents did not appeaL In this suit they 
complain against Salt Lake City for shutting off those 
wells and for drilling and pumping the large 20-inch well. 
At the trial these matters were considered to be res 
judicata, and the suit was dismissed against Salt Lake 
City. (R. 140) 
The evidence at the instant trial showed that capping 
the 25 wells and drilling the 20-inch well plus removing 
the Moyle farm and other farm land on the east bench 
from irrigation, served substantially to reduce the surface 
flow at respondents' point of diversion. This was clearly 
demonstrated by testimony that wells on the Moyle farm, 
which formerly flowed, and the pond had gone dry. (R. 
367-68) All of this occurred before the appellants in-
stalled the drains and covered the ponds which are the 
acts here complained of. 
In the spring of 1955 Arcon Corporation started to 
subdivide the Ferguson lands and the westerly side of 
the Moyle property. (R. 356) The 25 City wells had 
been capped in April, and, prior to appellants' commence-
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ment of work, there was no surface stream whatsoever. 
The lower pond was dry at this time and there was no 
difficulty in working the area and filling the pond. (R. 
359) In order to develop the land for subdivision pur-
poses, a tile drain was installed running east and west 
on the south side of the marshy area known as Spring 
Run Creek. A tile drain, which also ran generally east 
and west, was installed on the North side of Spring Run 
Creek. These drains had the effect of further drawing the 
water table down. (R. 314-15) They were necessary to the 
use of the land for subdivision purposes. (R. 216) None of 
the drains were located within the stream, but were lo-
cated more than 100 feet away from the Spring Run 
Creek channel to dry up the marshy area. The tile drain 
discharged into Spring Run Creek channel at a point 
within 8 feet of the base of the impounding dam for the 
lower pond. (R. 220) The quantity of water placed in 
the channel at this point is more than enough to meet the 
water needs of respondents. (R. 166, 338) Respondent 
Seo testified unequivocally that their complaint was not 
concerned with the quantity of water. Their complaint is 
that at the point of discharge into the channel the water 
was approximately six to eight feet lower than the ele-
vation of the easterly side of respondents' ground. (R. 
220). In order to get their water on to the easterly side 
of the land, it was necessary to pump, but there was 
plenty of water. (R. 338) 
The evidence was uncontradicted to the effect that 
respondents built an impounding dam across the channel 
inside their own field. (R. 445) The impounding dam was 
6 
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not so high as to cause the water to inundate the outlet 
of the drain. This dirt-filled dam cost respondents from 
$50 to $100.00. (R. 445, 452) They had a ditch from it 
by which it would be possible to convey water by gravity 
to all but five acres of their land. (R. 429-30) Thus, all 
of their land but five acres can be irrigated by gravity 
flow from Spring Run Creek by using an existing dam 
located on respondents' own property. To irrigate the 
other five acres, it will be necessary to pump. (R. 430) 
The court ordered appellants to pump water for all the 
lands. 
The court also awarded respondents damages for loss 
of expected profits from crops, including a celery crop 
which was not planted due to unavailability of early 
spring water. The court also awarded respondents the 
full cost of a pump, aluminum pipe, a trailer to haul it on, 
and depreciation on a tractor used to operate the pump, 
and, in addition, ordered appellants to install and main-
tain a new pump. 
The judgment of the court was entered against all of 
the appellants, although there was no evidence to show 
that Arcon Corporation or any of the individual defend-
ants had anything to do with the activity that allegedly 
interfered with respondents' water. All of the defend-
ants have appealed. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT No. 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPEL-
LANTS COULD DRAIN THEIR LANDS TO MAKE 
A REASONABLE USE THEREOF ONLY IF THE 
SAME COULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFER-
ING WITH THE RESPONDENTS' USE OF THE 
WATER. 
PoiNT No. 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RE-
SPONDENTS HAVE AN EASEMENT OR RIGHT 
TO REQUIRE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ·-
PONDS ON APPELLANT ARGON CORPORA-
TION'S LAND. 
POINT Xo. 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RE-
SPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
THREE CUBIC FEET OF WATER PER SECOND 
FOR THE IRRIGATION OF TWENTY ACRES OF 
LAND. 
PoiNT Xo. 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES. 
PoiNT No. 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST ALL OF THE APPELLANTS. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT No. 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPEL-
LANTS COULD DRAIN THEIR LANDS TO MAKE 
A REASONABLE USE THEREOF ONLY IF THE 
SAME COULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFER-
ING WITH THE RESPONDENTS' USE OF THE 
WATER. 
Appellant had the right to make a reasonable use of 
their land, even though it interfered with respondents' 
historic manner of using the water. This point is of cru-
cial public interest, for if a land owner has a vested right 
to maintain the water table in adjacent land at or near 
the surface level, then the adjoining land owners can be 
effectively prevented from making reasonable use of 
their land. 
This is not a problem of water law. Appellants claim 
no interest in the water, and respondents freely admit 
that the quantity of water has not been diminished and 
that there has always been more than ample water. 
(R. 338) The drains which respondents installed return 
the water to the channel within eight feet of the impound-
ing dam which previously existed on the lower pond, or 
at the point which historically would have been respond-
ents' diversion point. (R. 22) Engineer Ward stated posi-
tively that the pond could not have been filled after the 
installation of the drains as they presently are (R. 314), 
even though he testified that the pond, through the years, 
had become impervious and watertight (R. 300-01). An 
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impervious pond can only be filled if water is introduced 
above the impervious layer. (R. 325) The drains and the 
taking of lands out of irrigation and the capping of 25 
wells, however, have pulled the water table down to such a 
point that water will not flow on the surface into the 
pond. At the outset, therefore, we are confronted with 
the question as to whether appellants bad a right to lower 
the water table in their lands by installing drains which 
would enable them to make a reasonable use of their lands. 
The trial court totally failed to note a basic distinc-
tion between the case at bar and a water law suit. The 
distinction is an essential one and is noted by all of the 
cases. Where the parties are in competition for the water 
and the right to use it, one set of rules applies. Where, 
as in this case, there is no competition for the water, but, 
rather, a claim by one landowner that he bas a right to 
make reasonable use of his own land, an entirely different 
set of rules applies. This distinction is universally 
recognized. 
(a) THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RECOG-
NIZES THE DISTINCTION: 
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the 
Law on Torts, Section 849, states: 
"Interferences with one person's use of water 
by another's use of water inYolve a conflict over 
the same physical substance, and raise problems of 
proprietary competition oYer that substance. 
These interferences are dealt with in Sections 850-
864. Interferences with a person's use of water 
10 
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by another's use of land or other activity which 
affects water only incidentally, do not directly 
raise problems of proprietary competition over 
the water itself, and therefore, in substance, in-
volve the same questions as other types of inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of land. Con-
sequently, the rules stated in Sections 822-840, 
governing invasions of interest in the use and en-
joyment of land, are equally applicable to such in-
terferences with a use of water." 
The Restatement then notes examples demonstrat-
ing the difference, as follows: 
'' 5. The A Mining Co. buys land and starts to 
mine for coal therein. In the process of excavation, 
the flow of subterranean water is interfered with, 
and a spring on near-by land in the possession of 
B dries up as a result. A's operations do not in-
volve a use of subterranean water, and its liabil-
ity to B is governed by the rules stated in Sec-
tions 822-840. 
'' 6. A and B are severally in possession of 
adjoining parcels of land. There is a well on B 's 
land from which he obtains water for domestic and 
other purposes. A digs a large well on his land and 
starts to take a considerable quantity of water 
therefrom. This substantially reduces the amount 
of water that B can obtain from his well. A is using 
subterranean water, and his liability to B is gov-
erned by the rules stated in Sections 858-863." 
It must be concluded from Sec. 822 that where there 
is no competition for the use of the water, but the land-
owner seeks merely to make reasonable use of his own 
land, he is liable only on the following concepts: 
(a) If the injury to the neighboring land-
owner is intentional, then there is liability only if 
11 
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the activity on one's own land is done with malice 
or is unreasonable. 
(b) If the injury is not intentional, then there 
is liability only if the acts on one's own lands were 
negligently done, or were reckless or ultra-
hazardous. 
(b) CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES RECOGNIZE THE 
DISTINCTION: 
The subject under discussion is elaborately annotated 
in 29 ALR 2d 1354 and, once again, the same distinction 
is emphasized. The Article is entitled "Liability for Ob-
struction or Diversion of Subterranean Water in Use of 
Land.'' The annotation deals with the intentional or unin-
tentional diversion of water, 
"as an incident of the use of the land or the cor~r 
duct of some activity thereon, such as ditching, 
excavating, mining, or the like, as distinguished 
from an obstruction or diversion primarily for 
the purpose of extracting or using the water. In 
other words, the arwnotation is not concerned u:itlz 
rights and liabilities in respect of a competitive 
use of the 1-cater itself." (emphasis added) 
The annotation is supplemental to the previous annota-
tions in 55 ALR 1386, and 109 ALR 395, dealing with sub-
terranean waters, springs and wells generally. 
Recognizing the position of the Restatement, the an-
notator notes that: 
''Under the rules adopted by the American 
Law Institute, liability for the interference with 
12 
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waters of this type in the use of one's own prop-
erty, to the injury of another, is determined by 
the rules governing liability for non-trespassory 
invasions of interest in the private use and en-
joyment of land generally. Thus, such liability 
depends upon whether the causative activity or 
conduct, (1) if intentional, was unreasonable, or 
(2) if unintentional, was negligent, reckless or 
ultrahazardous.'' 
In explaining the history of this distinction, the anno-
tation proceeds to note that the common law permitted 
the landowner to make reasonable use of his own land. 
Even though there was an injury to the neighbor as an 
incident to that use, there was no liability in the ab-
sence of negligence or malice (page 1358). A number of 
early cases are cited from jurisdiction following the early 
English common law rule. It is noted at page 1361 that 
several jurisdictions have repudiated the common law 
rule, but at page 1364 it is noted: 
"Under the rule or doctrine of correlative 
rights, as applied in most jurisdictions, the owner 
or occupant of the containing land is not precluded 
from utilizing it for any lawful and proper pur-
pose to which it is adapted, without liability for in-
cidental interferences with the waters, and he is 
required only to so exercise his proprietary rights 
as not unreasonably or unnecessarily to obstruct 
or divert such waters to the injury of neighboring 
proprietors. To state the proposition more con-
cisely, immunity depends upon whether the inter-
ference was reasonably necessary in connection 
with the use or improvement of the land.'' ( empha-
sis added) 
13 
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The above quotation reflects the conclusion of the 
annotator. The precise question in issue is further dis-
cussed at page 1368 where it is stated: 
"The rules governing liability for the ob-
struction or diversion of percolating waters in 
the use of one's own premises have been applied 
or invoked most frequently where the effect of the 
interference was to cut such waters off to drain 
them away from an adjoining or neighboring tract, 
so as to deprive the owner or occupant of the 
benefit thereof. In the following cases, it was held 
that the interference complained of was not action-
able under the rule prevailing in the particular 
jurisdiction.'' (emphasis added) 
Cases from fifteen jurisdictions are then cited. On 
page 1369 it is noted that aside from reasons previously 
noted, the right to uninterrupted passage of percolating 
water ''cannot be acquired by prescription.'' Cases which 
did hold the landowner liable are noted on page 1371, but 
only five states are there noted, to-wit: California, In-
diana, Kansas, Pennsylvania and Washington. The \Yash-
ington case, there cited, Patrick v. Smith, 75 Wash. 407, 
134 P. 1076, was expressly overruled by Erans Y. City of 
Seattle, noted below. On examination of the decisions 
from the other four states, it would appear tha:t only Cali-
fornia would uphold respondents' position. The Indiana 
case cited permitted damages only where "negligence 
or malice was shown." The I{ansas case cited permitted 
recovery where defendant negligently left "unfilled a 
core hole which it had bored in prospecting for gas and 
oil, in conseqm'nce of which wells on adjoining premises 
were drained and destroyed.'' The PennsylYania case 
14 
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also was based on negligence. Thus, in the absence of neg-
ligence or malice, all twenty of the jurisdictions cited, 
with the lone exception of California, denied liability for 
damages where the waters were interfered with by a land-
owner in making reasonable use of his own land. The 
annotator concluded: 
''To state the proposition more concisely, im-
munity depends upon whether the interference 
was reasonable necessary in connection with the 
use or improvement of the land.'' 
The ALR Blue Book, current to the year 1957, cites 
three additional cases. In each of the three, the courts 
held that there was no liability for interfering with water 
in making reasonable use of one's land. They are McCor-
mick Coal Company v. Shubert, 379 Pa. 309, 108 A. 2d 
723; Trillingham v. Alaska Housing Authority, 109 Fed. 
Supp. 924; United Fuel Gas Company v. Sawyer, (Ky.) 
259 sw 2d 466. 
The distinction under discussion is noted by Hutch-
ins, "Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in 
the West.'' To illustrate, he cites and discusses the Wash-
ington cases at pages 263-64. Of greatest significance is the 
case of Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 457 P. 2d 
984, wherein the City of Seattle was operating a gravel 
pit. The water table in the city's land was so high as to 
make it difficult to recover the sand and gravel, and so 
the city dug a drain. The plaintiffs were located on lands 
of lower elevation and they had developed water systems 
for the irrigation of their lands. The court observed that 
"These water systems have been fed and supplied with 
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amply sufficient water from springs and small streams 
which appear on the surface at points some distance from 
and below the level of the city's gravel pit." After the 
city drained its pit it was admitted that, almost imme-
diately "all of the water, or practically all, was diverted 
from springs and streams upon which respondents relied 
for the water supply, and that as a direct and proximate 
result of the opening of the ditch by the City, the respond-
ents suffered a total loss of their theretofore sufficient 
water supply.'' In concluding that the City had the right 
to make a reasonable use of its own property, the court 
stated: 
"The fact is well established that the appel-
lant city was making a reasonable use of its own 
property, and that the draining of the gravel pit 
was for the reasonable and proper purpose of ex-
tracting the gravel for use. Apparently, the gravel 
pit property ·was valuable for no other purpose 
than that of producing gravel, and the city, being 
the owner, had \Ye think, under the reasonable use 
and correlative rights doctrine, a legal right to 
so drain the gravel pit as to make the product 
thereof available for use 1cithout thereby incurring 
any liability to others." (emphasis added) 
Hutchins, after noting this case, at page 263, says: 
"Of course, the City was making a reasonable 
use of land which ma~y haYe been the onl~- practi-
cal use, and of which an incident was the removal 
of water from the graYel pit, * * *. It should be 
noted that no other limitations upon use are stated 
in this most recent case, but it should also be borne 
in m,ind that in this case the city was making a 
drain,age usc, rather than a use of wafer on the 
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overlying larnd for irrigation, domestic or manu-
facturing purposes.'' (emphasis added) 
Another helpful case comes from Oklahoma. In Can-
ada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Oklahoma 153, 64 P. 2d 694, 
the court summarized the rule relating to the distinction 
under discussion: 
'' * * * the rule of reasonable use as applied 
percolating waters does not prevent the proper 
use by any land-owner of the percolating waters 
subjacent to his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, 
irrigation, or otherwise ; nor does it prevent any 
reasonable development of his land by mining or 
the like, although the underground water of neigh-
boring proprietors may thus be interfered with 
or diverted; * * * '' 
See also Bristor v. Cheatha;m (Ariz.), 255 P. 2d 173. 
(c) THE UTAH CASES FOLLOW THIS SA1IE 
DOCTRINE 
The Utah cases are in harmony with the general rule. 
The primary and latest case in point is Peterson v. Cache 
County Dra.inage, 77 Utah 256, 294 P. 289, where a drain-
age district constructed a drain near and running paral-
lel with the east boundary of plaintiff's land. There was 
no competition for the use of the water, but the drain 
drew the water table down, rendering it impossible for 
the plaintiff to secure sufficient water to irrigate his prem-
ises. The lower court granted judgment against the de-
fendant. On appeal, the drainage district relied, to some 
extent, on the English common law rule which holds that 
water percolating through the soil without any definite 
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channel is a part of the soil, and that in the absence of 
malice the owner of the soil may intercept the water. The 
plaintiff contended that the common law rule had been 
modified in Utah and cited a great number of cases, in-
cluding the Washington case of Patrick v. Smith, 75 
Wash. 407, 134 P. 1076 (which has, as noted above, been 
overruled). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing the trial 
court's judgment for the plaintiff, noted that the modern 
tendency is away from the doctrine that a proprietor has 
an absolute right to use the percolating water in his land 
without regard to the rights of adjoining landowners. 
There was some argument as to the source of the water, 
but the Supreme Court, for the purposes of its decision, 
assumed that the water reaching the plaintiff's land has 
its origin in natural sources, and then squarely held that 
a neighboring landowner may drain his land without lia-
bility for lowering the water table in the lands of his 
neighbor. The court said: 
''Assuming, however, that the percolating 
water which found its way into plaintiff's prem-
ises before the drainage canal was constructed 
came from natural sources, stiU the defendant is 
not liable, in the absence of 1nalice or negligence, 
1nerely because the lfater table in plaintiff's land 
was lowered because of the construction by the de-
fendant of its drainage canal. X either the doctrine 
of reasonable use, nor the doctrine of correlative 
rights can aid the plaintiff in such a case. The 
proprietors of the land U'ithin. the drainage dis-
trict had a ri.qht to improre their lauds by drain-
ing thl' same. The plaintiff had no right to haYe the 
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water table within his premises maintained at a 
high level at the expense of rendering adjoining 
land unfit for use. The plaintiff does not here 
complain because he has an insufficient supply of 
percolating water to supply his needs, but his com-
plaint is founded upon the claims that the water 
table in his land was so lowered bv the construc-
tion of the defendant's drainage ca~al that he can 
not now irrigate his premises by the method of 
subirrigation as he was wont to do before the 
drainage canal was constructed.'' (emphasis 
added) 
The court went on to note that the doctrines of rea-
sonable use and correlative rights have not been and 
should not be : 
''extended so as to prevent a;n adjoining la;nd-
owner from improving his land by draining the 
same, even though such drainage may result in a 
lowering of the water table in the adjoining lands, 
nor should either of such doctrines be extended to 
make a landowner liable for damages to an ad-
joining landowner, so long as the drainage is 
effected without negligence and without malice." 
(emphasis added) 
In Roberts v. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 P. 1014, the 
court even applied this doctrine to a situation where the 
parties were competing for the water. In that case plain-
tiffs sought an injunction to prevent defendant from in-
terfering with certain underflow, or subterranean waters, 
which passed beneath the surface of and through the 
defendant's lands. Plaintiffs also sought to quiet title to 
the waters. In about 1905, because of irrigation of sur-
rounding lands, a quantity of water began to seep and 
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percolate, and at the time of the trial was percolating into ~end 
a natural channel. When not interfered with, these waters ~nei 
which found their way into the channel flowed down the )1Jlt 
natural channel to plaintiff's point of diversion as a sur-
face stream. The waters historically had been diverted 
from the channel and used by the plaintiffs to irrigate 
their land. 
In the month of J nne, 1910, the defendant constructed 
a number of wells by driving perforated pipe into the 
earth a short distance south and away from this natural 
channel, and in a natural depression upon the land. These 
pipes collected a quantity of water, and the defendant 
used it. This dried up the channel and deprived plaintiffs 
of all water. The Utah Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant had the right to intercept the water before it 
reached the river channel. The evidence clearly estab-
lished that immediately after the defendant installed the 
various pipes to intercept the water, the surface seeps in 
the channel disappeared. The court said : 
''The respondent undoubtedly had a right to 
drain his land of the water and put it in a condi-
tion for raising crops. TYllether lze did this by 
sinking wells or by digging drain ditches was of 
no concern to appellan.ts." (emphasis added) 
Thus, the Utah position is firmly established in har-
mony with the general rule that an owner of land has 
<>very right to reasonably drain his land to make a bene-
ficial use thereof. 
The court is thus squarely confronted with the ques-
tion whether an owner of land has a right to drain it, 
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even though such drainage causes incidental damage to 
his neighbor. Every state in the union that has passed 
upon this subject, with the lone exception of California, 
has said that an owner of land has such a right. The 
Restatement of the Law of Torts is in complete accord. 
The ALR Annotations are in complete accord. Hutchins, 
an eminent water authority, recognizes the soundness of 
the doctrine. And, of greatest importance, the only two 
Utah cases on the subject clearly establish such a right. 
The Gribble case held that the defendant "undoubtedly 
had a right to drain his lands of the water and put it in a 
condition for the raising of crops." The more recent 
Petersen case squarely held that the water law doctrines 
of reasonable use and correlative rights did not apply 
because it was not really a water problem, and said that 
the neighboring landowner had no right to have the water 
table maintained at a high level "at the expense of ren-
dering adjoining land unfit for use." 
Under the very clear, convincing, and nearly unani-
mous authority, appellants cannot be held liable unless it 
can be shown that they acted with malice and in an unrea-
sonable manner or else were negligent. Respondents made 
no effort to prove negligence nor to prove that the drain-
ing of appellants' land was unnecessary or unreasonable 
or done with malice. The trial court made no findings on 
any of these matters. The appellants acted with prudence 
and reason, and were free from malice. Their drain inter-
cepts percolating waters before they reach and become a 
part of any surface stream, and it delivers such water to 
the Spring Run channel at almost the exact point of the 
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previous impounding and diverting dam. The sole affect 
on the respondents (as in the Peterssn case, supra) is 
that the water table in appellants' lands has been reduced 
or drawn down, so that the waters will no longer flow on 
the surface, and thus they will not run into or fill a stor-
age pond, nor reach some five acres of plaintiffs' land by 
gravity. It is not the sufficiency of the water with which 
we are concerned. The flow is not diminished in quantity 
or quality. Appellants are not using any part of it. There 
is no evidence in the record to suggest that appellants 
acted in any manner which could subject them to liability 
to the respondents. 
Despite the clarity and persuasiveness of the law on 
this issue, it seems advisable at this point to insert a ques-
tion of fact. It is possible, even probable, that appellants' 
conduct was not the cause in fact of respondents' inability 
to get water at a sufficient elevation for gravity flow irri-
gation on all of their land. 
It must be stressed that there was no evidence at the 
trial to prove that Spring Run Creek would have flowed 
at all in 1955, even if appellants had not constructed their 
drains. This is so because much irrigation on lands of 
higher elevation has been discontinued (~Ioyle farm and 
much of the east bench which had been subdivided for 
residential purposes) (R. 354-55), the City had capped 
twenty-five flowing wells in April of the same year (R. 
;~;)6), and the City drilled a new twenty·-inch ''"ell to pipe 
water into the City system. It is sheer speculation, there-
fore, to assume that the water table would haYe been at 
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surface level to provide a flow in Spring Run Creek in any 
event. In fact, in view of the diminished water supply, it 
is extremely doubtful. One point is clear: Appellants' 
drains intercepted these percolating waters, including 
some waters at lower levels than Spring Run Creek, and 
discharged them near plaintiffs' historical point of di-
version. Coupled with this fact is engineer Ward's testi-
mony that the drains also save water which otherwise 
would have been lost by evaporation and transportation 
seepage (R. 322-23). It is true that the drains now dis-
charge the water at a lower elevation and thereby require 
pumping operations to irrigate five acres of respond-
ents' land which were previously irrigated by gravity 
flow. But, if the drains hadn't discharged the water at 
the lower elevation, it is distinctly possible that respond·-
ents would not have been able to irrigate any of their land 
by gavity flow. They can now so irrigate fifteen acres. 
No one has questioned that we had the right to stop 
irrigating our land and the court has already held in a 
previous case that the city had the right to cap the 25 
wells and drill a new 20-inch well. Respondents have 
failed to prove that respondents were negligent and can-
not recover because of work done on our own land. 
PoiNT No. 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RE-
SPONDENTS HAVE AN EASEMENT OR RIGHT 
TO REQUIRE THE MAINTENANCE OF THE 
PONDS ON APPELLANT ARGON CORPORA-
TION'S LAND. 
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If the court determines that appellants had a right ~~ 
to drain their land, then no other question need be here 1 t' 
determined. The question of the extent of the respond-
ents' vested rights to use the pond would clearly be moot, 
because the testimony stands uncontroverted that the 
pond would never have filled from the available waters 
with the drains installed. (R. 314) The drains destroyed 
the usefulness of the pond, and if appellants had the right 
to construct the drains, there can be no liability, even 
though the court were to conclude that respondents owned 
vested rights in appellants' fish ponds. 
Point I should dispose of the case. If, however, the 
Court should disagree, then the Court must determine 
what the respondents' vested rights were in the use of 
the lower pond. 
The evidence is not in controversy, so that the prob-
lem for decision is purely one of law. Ferguson testi-
fied that his father built the middle pond near the house, 
with some help from Mr. Boyce. (R. 258) Mr. Boyce 
asked, in effect, why he couldn't have some water out of 
this pond, and Mr. Ferguson's father said, in effect, that 
he saw no reason why :Mr. Boyce couldn't use the pond. 
(R. 258-59) So prior to 1903 ~Ir. Boyce constructed a 
ditch from the middle pond to irrigate part of the lands 
now owned by respondents. (R. 259) Later on, and prob-
ably by the early 1900's, as l\Ir. Ferguson testified, his 
father built the lower pond. (R. 275) l\Ir. Ferguson was 
very clear in his testimony that l\Ir. Boyre did not help 
in any way with the construction of the lower pond. (R. 
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275) It was constructed by defendants' predecessor in 
interest for his own use for fish culture. Later on, after 
the pond was completed, defendants' predecessor in in-
terest drilled approximately 25 wells to increase the flow 
of the water, and right up until the time that appellants 
acquired the land the wells flowed into the lower pond 
and it was used for fish culture. (R. 359-60) The wells 
were permitted to run to keep the ponds full. (R. 358) 
Also, the Moyle farm to the east was irrigated with a 
water right approximately two and one-half times greater 
than the needs of the land. (R. 319-20) 
Until the plaintiffs bought the land, the total contri-
bution of respondents' predecessors to the lower pond was 
a $6.00 contribution (six bags of cement) to repair a part 
of the dam. (R. 342-43) Respondents bought the land sev-
eral years ago, and once or twice they claim to have fur-
nished a few flash boards for the headgate and repaired 
some muskrat holes. (R. 223-25) There is no indication 
that they were requested to furnish the headgates or to 
fix the muskrat holes. There was no evidence that the 
pond was used for overnight storage for irrigation, or 
that the irrigators raised the pond, and then drained it 
down in irrigation. The evidence was to the contrary. The 
pond was a fish pond; its elevation was held constant by 
appellants' predecessor, and he built the pond on his own 
land for his own use and convenience. The ditch from the 
middle pond may have been used both by Ferguson and 
Boyce, but it was abandoned sometime between 1912 and 
1920, and Mr. Boyce moved to the lower pond. (R. 266) 
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He did not help build, nor did he help maintain the lower 
pond. (R. 275) 
The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the 
pond was built and maintained by the landowner solely 
for his own use. The cases are uniformly to the effect 
that the use of incidental benefits from a pond by people 
in the position of respondents is neither hostile nor 
adverse, and does not permit the creation of prescriptive 
rights to have the landowner continue to maintain his 
land in that condition for his neighbors' benefit. In fact, 
Bagley testified that during his period of use he 
acquiesced in the assertion of a superior right by appel-
lants' predecessor. In the 1934 drought there was not 
sufficient water to keep the pond full, even with the wells 
flowing into them, and Bagley was told not to use any 
water. And so he went without water that entire year. 
R. 340-41) 
The principle applicable to this situation is stated in 
"Farnham on Water Rights," page 2685, in a footnote, 
in which it is stated: 
''The fact that a ditch was dug upon one of 
two adjacent lots for its occupant's convenience, 
but which incidentally drained the surface water 
of the other, does not prF\'"ent a subsequent owner 
thereof from filling up such ditch and raising the 
grade of his lot a boYe its natural level so as 
to prevent the draining of such other lot as 
before, • * * '' 
Farnham, at Section 8~7 (b), page 2429, further 
states: 
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"A landowner has no riparian rights in an 
artificial pond adjoining his land from which he 
has been accustomed to water his cattle and to take 
water for other farm purposes, where it is fed by 
water flowing through an artificial water course 
constructed for the purpose of diverting water 
from a natural stream into the pond for the opera-
tion of the adjoining landowner's mill, although 
such artificial water course and pond have existed 
for more than a century, as such an artificial water 
course is temporary in its nature, as it is limited 
to the period during which the mill is used; and 
the owner of the mill property may stop the flow 
of the water or construct a fence along the boun-
dary line so as to deprive the adjoining owner of 
the use of the pond. No presumption arises that 
a water course was constructed under an agree-
ment with an adjoining owner under which he 
acquired prescriptive rights in the use of the 
water, from the mere fact of the existence of the 
artificial water course, where all the works were 
constructed on the land of the owner of the water 
course, and no burdens were cast upon the adjoin-
ing owner." (emphasis added) 
Farnham further states at page 2438: 
''If the new channel is merely artificial and 
made for the accommodation of the dominant 
owner, mere acquiescence in the making of such 
use of the flow of the water as the circumstances 
will allow by the lower owner cannot be regarded 
as an adverse user. There must, in addition, be 
an assertion of the right to have the flow continued, 
and notice to the upper owner that he will not 
be permitted to change the flow." 
The subject is annotated in 88 ALR 130. The 
majority view is that where an owner constructs an arti-
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ficial condition for his own use and a lower user inci-
dentally benefits therefrom, the lower user cannot acquire 
a prescriptive right therein. The cases which follow this 
view deny the existence of a prescriptive right on the 
grounds that an adverse use is an essential element of the 
acquisition of prescriptive rights, and the enjoyment of 
incidental benefits of artificial improvements on another's 
lands lacks sufficient adverse intent. 
The annotation at page 136 collects a number of 
cases involving dams. Every one of the cases there cited 
involves a situation where the dam had existed for more 
than the prescriptive period. An adjoining landowner 
had received benefits from the dam. The owner of the 
dam and reservoir in each of the cases for some reason 
or another wanted to abandon the dam and let the water 
return to its normal course or level. In each of the cases 
the adjoining landowner urged the right to have the dam 
maintained, and in every one of the cases noted the courts 
held that no such right existed, and in each case the owner 
of the dam was permitted to abandon it. 
Representative of those cases are the following: 
In Goodrich v. J.licJ1i1lan, 217 ~Iich. 630, 187 N. W. 
368, 26 ALR 801, a predecessor in title of the defendant 
built a mill dam. The dam raised the natural level of sev-
eral small lakes, causing them to overflow on to certain 
lower lands. After n period of 67 years, the dam became 
decayed hy age and "·ent out of existence. The plaintiffs, 
in the meantime, had built summer cottages and hotels on 
the adjoining land "·ith reference to the artificialleYel of 
28 
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the lakes and had enjoyed the benefits of such artificial 
level for a period of nearly 50 years. Plaintiffs alleged 
that the return to the natural level had damaged them 
seriously. They sought to require the defendant either 
to rebuild and repair the dam himself, or to permit the 
plaintiffs to enter upon defendant's premises to rebuild 
the dam. They asserted that they had acquired a right 
to have the waters maintained at the artificial level. The 
court held that no such right existed, and said that the 
defendant might either take out his dam or, after it went 
out, refuse to rebuild it, and as to that "plaintiffs have 
no legal concern.'' The court quoted from an annotation 
in 50 ALR 841, as follows: 
''In the absence of peculiar circumstances 
sufficient to constitute an estoppel upon the owner 
of the prescriptive right, or to give the adverse 
party himself an adverse right, the better opinion 
is that the mere acquisition of a prescriptive right 
to an artificial condition of water will impose no 
obligation to maintain such condition. The reason 
for this is that adverse use is necessary to estab-
lish prescriptive rights.'' 
The .Michigan court later followed the same rule in 
Pere Jl!Jarquiette R. Co. v. Siegle, 260 Mich. 89, 244 N. W. 
239, and observed that the owner of a mill dam is notre-
quired to operate the dam for the benefit of a person who 
acquires the right to harvest ice from the mill pond. 
In Albert Lea v. Nielsen, 80 Minn. 101, N. W. 1104, 
81 Am. St. Rep. 242, adjoining landowners had improved 
their lands in reliance upon the permanency of an ease-
ment which had been acquired by a mill owner for the con-
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struction of a dam. The court held that, even though the 
easement benefitted plaintiffs' lands, they cannot com-
plain when the easement is abandoned. 
In Vliet v. Sherwood, 35 Wis. 229, the defendant 
constructed a reservoir to operate a mill. Water ran JM' 
through the defendant's mill and for a period of 20 years 
or more the plaintiff's lower mill used the water. The 
defendant, after a lapse of 20 years, had his mill destroyed 
by fire. Plaintiff claimed that she had acquired a pre-
scriptive right to have the water flow from the defend-
ant's reservoir to her mill in the same manner as it had 
flowed for more than 20 years. The court denied the plain-
tiff's claim to a prescriptive right, saying that the right 
must have been exercised adverse against the defendant, 
and that this element was lacking. The court observed that 
the plaintiff doubtlessly had derived incidental benefit 
from the reservoir, and that so long as defendant oper-
ated his mill, plaintiff would receive the benefit, but her 
use of the water after defendant had discharged it from 
his mill was not inconsistent with or adverse to the use 
which the defendant made of it. 
In the principal case annotated, Drainage District Y. 
E1'erett, 171 Wash. 471, 18 P. 2d 53, quoting from the syl-
labus, the court said : 
''Neither the maintenance for the prescriptive 
period of a dam impounding the waters of a 
stream, nor the maintenance for the prescriptive 
period of drainage ditches by a. drainage district 
organized hy lower proprietors sufficient only to 
take care of the diminished flow, and their enjoy-
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ment for such period of the land thus reclaimed, 
give the drainage district a right to have the con-
dition so created continued for its benefit." 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that under the 
better reasoned authorities where an owner, as in the case 
at bar, constructs a fish pond for his own use, a lower 
user obtains no prescriptive right to compel the owner of 
the reservoir to maintain it. It is not controverted here 
that Ferguson built and maintained the dam for his own 
use. Nor is there evidence that respondents' predecessors 
in any way contributed thereto. The dam was built for 
fish culture. Water was placed in it from 25 wells, and 
from the capturing of return flow from irrigation. The 
fish culture use was non-consumptive, and the overflow 
from the pond went down to the respondents' land. The 
respondents' use of this overflow was in no way adverse 
to the use and maintenance of the pond by appellants' 
predecesesors. Mr. Boyce was given express permission 
to use the water, but, when there was a water shortage in 
1934, Mr. Bagley was expressly prohibited from using 
any water and he willingly complied by using no water 
during that year. ( R. 340-41) 
Since there is no evidence of an adverse, open and 
notorious use of the pond, and since appellants created the 
pond in question solely for their own use and benefit, the 
law is clear that respondents have no right to have the 
ponds maintained so that they can continue to enjoy their 
incidental benefits as adjoining landowners. 
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PorNT No. 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RE~ 
SPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
THREE CUBIC FEET OF WATER PER SECOND 
FOR THE IRRIGATION OF TWENTY ACRES OF 
LAND. 
If the court holds that appellants are wrong on 
both Points 1 and 2, and that they have a duty to 
replace the water for the respondents, then in this 
regard the trial court committed three three highly preju-
dicial errors. First, it has found, without any evidentiary 
support, that respondents are the owners of the right to 
receive 3 c. f. s. of water; second, it has ordered appellants 
to pump all of the water perpetually, despite the fact that 
all but five acres of the land can be irrigated by gravity 
flow; and, third, it has decreed a water right which is 
indefinite in its terms and which is unreasonable in its 
quantity. 
(a) The evidence does not sustain a finding that 
respondents haYe appropriated three cubic 
feet of water per second. 
There is really no dispute in the evidence. The 
onl~T witnesR who fixed the irrigated acreage was 
l\fr. Bagley, who testified that during the nearly 
16 years when he owned the land it was naturally 
wet. (R. 339). This is consistent with all the other evi-
dence. The topographic map shows this area to be a 
swamp. (I~Jxh. 3-D and 3-D-a) ~fr. \Yard indicated that , 
,_-
-_,· 
··-
--
the ground water ·was high enough to reach the root zone. ' trdl 
(R. 339) When Bagley owned this land, many crops ~~ 
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needed no surface water at all (R. 339), and during the 
16-year period Mr. Bagley irrigated no more than four 
acres of land ( R. 341). Even if there had been an appro-
priation of sufficient water to irrigate 20 acres of land 
prior to 1903 (a matter on which there is no evidence), 
the 16 years when Bagley was on the place, would 
have ca;used a forfeiture of water not used. Under 
Section 73-1-4, U.C.A. (1953), an owner of a water 
right will lose it if he permits it to remain unused when 
it is available for five continuous years. The evidence 
without contradiction shows an appropriation of only 
sufficient water for four acres. The land was wet enough 
that no more water than this was needed. If in 1903 more 
water than that were appropriated, it was in any event 
forfeited by Bagley's 16 years of non-use. 
A right initiated prior to 1903 cannot be enlarged 
after 1903 without a new filing with the State Engineer, 
vVellsville V. Lindsay Land and Livestock Co., 104 Ut. 
448, 137 P. 2d 634 (1943). In the case at bar respondents 
made no such filing. In recent years respondents changed 
alfalfa fields into row crops. Alfalfa, as the court judi-
cially knows, and as Mr. Ward testified (R. 332), has a 
root zone that goes down many feet. It needed no arti-
ficial application of water on this land. Respondents 
have changed the nature of their use to row crops, which, 
according to Mr. Ward, take twice as much water (R. 
332). This change was not made until 1944 and after 
their predecessor had irrigated only four acres of 
land less than three times per year. Mr. Bagley thus used 
probably less than twelce acre-feet of water per year. 
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Respondents started to divert and use, according to Mr. 
Ward, approximately six acre-feet per acre on the full :.:: 
20 acres of land, or approximately 120 acre-feet per year 
(R. 331). There is no principle of law whereby they could 
increase their consumptive use of water from 12 to 120 
acre-feet per year, and likewise increasing their claimed 
burden on appellants' land. This is an increase of 1,000 per 
cent. And yet, without a filing with the State Engineer 
and without a twenty-year prescriptive use as to the 
claimed burden on appellants' land, respondents claim 
that they had a vested right to so increase their consump-
tive use. 
Aside from the extremely tenuous legal position in 
which respondents find themselves, they are confronted 
with an equally disconcerting question of fact. Simply 
stated, it is that there is nowhere any evidence of an 
appropriation of 3 c. f. s. of water. Indeed, respondents 
never at any time claimed that they had appropriated 
such an amount. To the contrary, respondent Seo testi-
fied as follows: (R. 155) 
Q. Now, in the irrigation of your farm lands, 
could you tell the court approximately what 
size of flow you used for your operations? 
A. We used to use between one and two second-
feet. 
He went on to testify that this usage was only intermit-
tent, depending on whether winds would occur to accel-
erate the drying of the land (R. 155). 
The court was thus confronted with uncontroverted 
testimony to the effect that (1) respondents did not have 
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the legal right to increase their appropriations beyond 
Bagley's right to irrigate four acres three times a year 
and ( 2) even though there was an unlawful increase in 
use, even that increase never exceeded a flow of two cubic 
feet per second. Despite this, the court decreed a water 
right of three cubic feet per second. 
(b) It was error to order appellants to pump 
water for more than five acres of respondents' 
land. 
This is a simple point, but a very important one. 
The evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that after 
the lower pond on appellants' land was destroyed, re-
spondents put a dirt dam in the channel on their own land 
and made a pond from which they pumped. (R. 445) They 
constructed a ditch, which respondents admitted had been 
used. Appellants caused a survey to be made and the 
unequivocal testimony was that an actual survey of the 
ground shows that all but five acres of respondents' lands 
can now be irrigated by gravity flow (R. 429-430). To 
place the burden upon appellants to pump in perpetuity 
enough water for 20 acres, when as a matter of fact all 
but five of the acres can be irrigated by gravity flow, 
was error. 
(c) It was error to decree a water right which is 
indefinite in its terms and unreasonable in its 
quantity. 
If appellants must pump water for respondents they 
are entitled to a more definite decree than that fixed by 
the trial court. The court did not define the respondents' 
water right at all, except for a finding that they are 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entitled to take water at the rate of three cubic feet 
per second. There is no indication when the season 
is to start, or when it is to end. There is no 
finding as to the acreage irrigated. Nor is there any 
indication as to how many acre-feet are to be applied 
to the land per year. Even if the evidence would sus-
tain the three c. f. s. finding, it is highly prejudicial to 
order appellants to replace the water and not otherwise 
define the right. As the decree now stands, appellants 
would be required to pump water at the rate of three 
c. f. s. almost at the whim of respondents. Appellants' 
counsel objected and asked the trial court to fix the sea-
son of use and the duty of water, etc., but the objections 
were overruled. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously said that 
when it can not be determined from a decree how much 
water has been awarded thereby, the decree is void for 
uncertainty. A brief reference to some of the leading 
Utah cases will be helpful. In Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 
Utah 14, 168 P. 273, the decree gave no indication as to the 
fall of the ditch, its \Telocity or the amount of land to be 
irrigated by it. It was therefore held that the decree was 
Yoi<l. In Francis Y. Roberts, 73 rtah 98, 272 Pac. 633, the ~ 
dcrrel' of the trial was indefinite in that it failed to fix ~: 
the irrigation season. The eYidence was conclusive to the 
effect that in no season was irrigation necessary before 
April 1st. The court held that the decree should, there-
fore have fixed this date as the earliest time in an~T season 
for whieh the use of water in controversy by the defend-
ants for irrigation should begin. Because of the failure to 
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fix this, the case was reversed. In McNaughton v. Eaton, 
121 Utah 394, 242 P. 2d 570, the trial court failed to fix 
the details of MeN aughton's water right. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed, directing the lower court to de-
termine the duty of water. In Smith v. Phillips, 6 Utah 
376, the court reversed a decree for uncertainty, where 
the a~ard was for "one good irrigation stream" of water 
from th~ creek in question 60 hours out of every sixteen 
days. In Holman v. Pleasant Grove City, 8 Utah 78, the 
court held that a decree which provided that in normal 
times the plaintiff was entitled to sufficient water to irri-
gate 60 acres of land was improper, since the decree 
should specify the amount of water necessary by an ap-
proved method of measurement. Similarly, in Nephi 
Irrigation Companyv. Jenkins, 8 Utah 369, the trial court 
found that the defendant was the prior appropriator and 
decreed he was entitled to use water to the extent of his 
prior appropriation, but did not determine the extent 
thereof. The court held the decree was uncertain and 
should be set aside on appeal. In Lost Creek Irrigation 
Company, v. Rex, 26 Utah 485, 73 P. 660, the court award-
ed the plaintiff and defendant each one-half of the normal 
flow of the water in a creek after June 15th of each year. 
Held, the decree is too uncertain in that it fixes no time 
when the normal flow of water ceased and the high water 
began. In Hardy v. Beaver County Irrigation Company, 
65 Utah, 28, 234 Pac. 524, the court stated that the main 
purpose of an action to quiet title is to determine the re-
spective rights of the parties to the use of the water, and 
the decree should definitely award the respective rights 
to the parties to the action. The decree must be sufficiently 
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definite and certain as to the parties, the order of their 
respective priorities, the quantity of water which each is 
entitled to use, the times when they are entitled to use 
the water, and any other matter which the evidence of 
each particular case may develop. The failure of the 
decree to contain such elements with reasonable certainty 
is error. 
In the case at bar, the decree does not even define 
the land to be irrigated. It decrees that respondents are 
the owners and entitled to the use of approximately three 
cubic feet per second of water from Spring Run Creek for 
the purpose of irrigating lands which respondents own 
in portions of Sections 8, 9, 16 and 17 of T. 2 S., R. 1 E. 
The acreage is not given. The particular land to be irri-
gated is not described. No element of the appropriation 
is fixed, except that respondents are entitled to '' approxi-
mately" 3 c. f. s. (R. 123) Reference to the findings 
doesn't clarify. Finding No. 1 only provides that the re-
spondents are the owners of "approximately" 25 acres 
of land. (R. 114) The evidence is uncontradicted that 
there is a substantial portion of this land located north of 
Spring Run Creek which is not irrigated, so there isn't 
even a finding as to the acreage irrigated, or for which 
appellants must for all time to come pump 3 c. f. s. of 
water. (R. 123) 
It is submitted that where appellants have been or-
dered to pump in perpetuity the water for the lands of 
the respondents, there must be a more definite decree 
fixing the beginning and the end of the irrigation season, 
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the rate of flow, the duty of the land, and the total quan-
tity of water in acre-feet respondents are entitled to re-
ceive. Otherwise, appellants are at respondents' mercy 
to pay for pumping upon demand with no limitation as 
to beneficial needs. 
Finally, an observation must be made as to the rea-
sonableness of the amount of water awarded. Certainly 
respondents must limit themselves to the quantity of 
water they can beneficially use. It is inconceivable that 
they could use on their approximately nineteen acres of 
ground a continuous flow of three cubic feet per second. 
This would amount to six acre-feet per day. They are 
claiming an unusually long irrigation season, totaling 
more than 220 days. A continuous flow would yield 1320 
acre-feet of water, and on their acreage this would amount 
to more than 60 acre-feet of water per acre of land per 
year. In this state, where the Supreme Court has again 
and again affirmed as adequate a duty of water between 
three and four acre-feet per acre, this is fantastically 
high. There is no evidence to sustain such use. 
The conclusion is inescapable. The trial court's de-
cree of a water right of three c.f.s. is indefinite and ex-
cessive. It is, therefore, void. 
PorNT No. 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES. 
(a) The court erred in awarding damages for loss 
of crops not planted. 
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One of the hornbook rules of damages, which is so 
clear that Professor McCormick states it unequivocally, 
is simply: "If the invasion merely prevents the plaintiff 
from planting his land, the measure is not the value of the 
hoped for crop, but the rental value of the land for the 
season." McCormick, Damages § 126 (1935). 
The cases all sustain this rule of damages. The head-
note to Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jackson, 217 P. 2d 816 
(Okla.) is a fair representation of existing case law: 
''The measure of damage for anticipated loss 
of crops which could not be planted by reason of 
damage caused is the reasonable rental value of _n.l 
the land for the season.'' 
An annotation in 108 ALR 1174 reaffirms the rule. It 
is entitled ''Measure and Amount of Damage for Breach 
of Duty to Furnish Water, Gas, Lights or Power." The 
annotator states the rule on page 1185 as follows: 
''The raising of a crop not yet planted being 
too uncertain, and damages based upon the as-
sumption of loss of profits from such a crop being 
altogether too speculative, it has been held in a 
number of such cases that the true measure of 
damages for failure to furnish water for irrigation 
was the difference between the rental value of 
the land with the water and its rental value 
without it.'' 
In support of this rule, the annotation cites many 
cases. 
The law in Utah is well settled and supports this 
rule. In ~1damson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 
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264, the court held that expected profits lost by a land-
owner on future crops of wheat which he failed to plant 
(because of lack of irrigation water) were not proper ele-
ments of damage for permanent destruction of his ease-
ment in an irrigation ditch which was destroyed by own-
ers of adjacent land. If the crops were already planted 
or in existence, a different rule of computing damages 
would apply. But where the crops have not yet been 
planted, the complainant can only hope to recover the cost 
of preparing and cultivating the ground and the actual 
expense of purchasing seed which is lost by the inability 
to plant. (Adamson case at page 82) In the cases of Nay-
lor v. Floor, 51 Utah 382, 170 Pac. 971 (1918); Sharp v. 
Cankis Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 Pac. 337 (1924) and 
Petrofesa v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 
110 Utah 109, 169 P. 2d 808 (1946) the issue was the 
measure of damage to crops which were growing. It is 
admitted that in such a situation the profit reasonably to 
be expected, less cost of growing and harvesting, is the 
measure of recovery. In the Petrofesa case the plaintiff 
had been delayed in planting his celery crop because the 
defendant railroad had covered his irrigation ditch. The 
issue there before the court was the measure of damage to 
a crop which had been planted late in the season, such 
delay causing a loss when the celery was marketed. It 
was therefore appropriate for the court to apply the 
measure of damages applicable to growing crops. 
The above cases are cited to emphasize the distinc-
tion between crops not yet planted and crops which are 
already planted. In the case at bar the respondents had 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
celery plants in a greenhouse and they claim that they 
were prevented from setting out the plants because of 
appellants' interference with the water. Consequently, 
respondents failed to plant celery in two and one-half 
acres of land which had been prepared for planting. They 
contend that, had they planted the land, they would have 
grossed $5,000.00. Estimated harvesting and growing 
expenses are then deducted by the respondents and a net 
loss of $2,800.00 is assessed. (R. 17 4) 
It is submitted that it was manifestly erroneous to 
measure damages as if these were growing crops. The 
celery crop was never planted. Squash was planted and 
a lower gross was realized. To allow damages for expect-
ed profits of a celery crop which was never planted is 
absurd. There is no case which allows expected profits 
for a crop which was never set in the ground. It is even 
more ridiculous to allow expected profits for one type of 
crop (celery) when a different type of crop (squash) was 
actually grown on the land in question. All that respond-
ents can hope to recover is the cost of growing the celery 
plants which were never planted. The cost of cultivating 
the land is not a logical item of damage since squash 
was planted and the cultivation was not a loss. Respond-
ents might argue that the celery plants were growing 
crops since they were ''in existence.'' This is without 
merit. The Adamson case, supra, mentions damage to 
crops which are ''in existence'' as an item of special 
damage. Every reasonable indication suggests that crops 
have three stages: (1) Before they are planted; (2) after 
they are planted, but before they come into existence; 
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and (3) after they come into existence (i. e., after they 
are growing). This interpretation is sustained by the fact 
that in the Adamson case there had been an expenditure 
for wheat which was not planted. The court was willing 
to allow the actual cost of the wheat as an expense, but 
never entertained the thought of allowing damages for 
expected profit on a crop of wheat that was never planted. 
The rule allowing only the rental value of the land 
is a practical rule. Where the crop is planted, there is 
no way to salvage the seed and rent other lands. Where, 
however, the seed has not been planted, the operator 
may find other lands and run his risks of profit or loss. 
Thus, his damages are limited by the courts to the rental 
value of land. 
(b) The court erred in awarding damages which 
respondents failed to mitigate. 
It is elemental in the law of damages that, absent 
some malicious act on the part of defendant, plaintiff is 
under an obligation to mitigate his damage. If he fails to 
do this, he can recover only the amount which his damages 
would have been if there had been a proper mitigation. 
Respondents, if they had so elected, could have 
adopted either of two convenient methods of mitigating 
their damages. First, for a price of only $25.00 per week, 
they could have rented a pump which would have pumped 
adequate water for their lands. (R. 413-14) Secondly, 
they could have put in a dam for a cost of only $75.00 
which would have been so situate! that it would have 
provided gravity flow irrigation for fifteen acres. (R. 429-
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30, 445, 452) Both of these solutions were reasonable, 
inexpensive and convenient. Either one would have pro-
vided water for ample acreage to plant the celery crop 
as early in May as they desired. Since respondent Seo 
testified that he knew as early as May 4 that water would 
not be delivered to them, and since he testified that he 
knew substantial damage would result (R. 204-06), there 
is no justification for failing to mitigate when either of 
the methods above would, at nominal cost, have pre-
vented a claimed loss of a crop expected to gross 
$5,000.00. 
It is submitted that, under earlier arguments, appel-
lants are not liable to respondents for any damages. If, 
however, damages are assessed for loss of crops, the 
amount can only be $25.00 per week for three weeks as 
the rental value of a pump plus an additional $25.00 to 
$30.00 for gasoline to run the pump, or, in the alternative, 
the damage figure could be $75.00, which was the cost of 
building the impounding dam which provided water for 
fifteen acres by gravity. (R. 445, 452) 
(c) The court erred in awarding duplicate dam-
ages. 
In referring to Finding No. 11, it appears that the 
court awarded general damages as follows: 
Cost of a pump ----------------------------------$ 
Cost of dam for catch-basin ___________ _ 
Digging of dam for catch-basin _____ _ 
Cost of pipe-11lengths @ $25.45 
Hauling of pipe to land ___________________ _ 
827.00 
75.00 
75.00 
370.95 
100.00 
-· 
------
_·1.:.: 
-- .. ~ 
-.: 
~~~ 
j~~ta 
j~~ 
Total .................................................................................. $1,411.75 ~ ~~ s 
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There is no testimony whatever to indicate that 
the pump which was purchased is worn out or that the 
pipe is worn out. Yet, the court ordered appellants to 
install a suitable and efficient electrical pumping system 
for respondents. If appellants fail so to do, respondents 
are awarded judgment for an additional $1,500.00. It 
is respectfully submitted that this is error. This requires 
appellants to buy two pumps. First, they must pay the 
full purchase price of the pump that respondents 
bought; and, second, they are required to pay for and 
install an additional pump. Certainly there should be a 
credit for the remaining value of the original pump if 
appellants are required to install a new one. 
Appellants are also ordered by the decree to place 
the water to be pumped in perpetuity "at a point in the 
Northeast corner of plaintiffs' lands where the large 
drain enters plaintiffs' properties as a substitute sys-
tem in lieu of the ditches and facilities which defendants 
previously destroyed." (R. 123) Again, no credit is 
allowed for the aluminum pipe which obviously still re-
mains. The court simply granted respondents' prayer. 
In fact, reference to the memorandum indicates that the 
court granted respondents more than they wanted, and 
several matters were voluntarily eliminated when the 
findings and conclusions were presented. It appears that 
the trial judge did not go beyond a consideration of the 
question of liability. Having once determined the issues 
of law against appellants, the trial judge simply granted 
everything that had been mentioned in the evidence and, 
as to some items, doubled the damages. He ordered 
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appellants in the memorandum decision to pay the future 
cost of pumping, but still awarded respondents $1,600.00 
for estimated future pump operations. He ordered ap-
pellants to install the pump, but gave respondents a 
$1,500.00 judgment for the same. In the top item on page 
4 of the memorandum decision, he gave respondents 
tractor rental of $946.00, labor costs of $410.00, etc., and 
then under special damages gave judgment again for the 
same items. (R. 106) His total judgment as awarded by 
the memorandum decision was $13,344.00. This was vol-
untarily cut down by respondents to $8,217.00, thus elimi-
nating nearly $5,000.00 of duplicate awards. 
We respectfully submit that respondents, under any-
body's theory of the case, still have been permitted to 
recover the duplicate cost of the pump and the pipe. 
(d) The court erred in awarding other items of 
damage not sustained by the evidence. 
This final subsection is intended to be a brief com-
mentary on the nature of respondents' testimony and its 
adequacy in sustaining the damages awarded. Respond-
ent Seo testified that his tractor ·which he had used for 
pumping had depreciated $1,000.00 while being used for 
that purpose and that its present value was only $500.00. 
Upon cross-examination, however, he admitted that he 
would not sell his tractor for that price. (R. 203) This 
was a clear confession that the depreciation really hadn't 
been as great as he testified on direct examination. Yet, 
the court awarded the full amount claimed in his initial 
testimony. 
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There are many things in respondents' testimony 
which simply do not ring true. Respondents were only 
without water until May 23rd, which is the date they 
started pumping. They allege that, because they were 
without water for ten days, enormous damage resulted. 
This seems incredible in light of the fact that, in respond-
ents' suit against Salt Lake City because it capped its 
wells, respondent Seo testified that they depended for 
early water on the wells and that the surface flow did not 
normally start until after the middle of May. His spe-
cific testimony is as follows : 
"Q. And about how early in the spring would it 
be before the spring water came in with the 
well water as a general rule 1 
''A. It would be after May. 
'' Q. Is that after May 1 or-
" A. Well, I believe it would be after the mid-
dle of May." 
Mr. Seo then testified in this trial that he knew by May 
4th, when the ponds were destroyed, that appellants were 
not going to furnish him with water. He testified that he 
foresaw the impending damage, yet made no imme-
diate effort to rent a pump or construct the impounding 
dam. (R. 204-06) 
In light of respondent Seo 's testimony that they re-
lied on the water from the City wells for their early May 
water because water is not normally available from 
Spring Run Creek until after the middle of May, it should 
be noted that Mr. Ward testified that the drains would 
reach additional water which was not available at the sur-
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face of Spring Run Creek. (R.322-23) Spring Run Creek 
flows only when the ground water tables are brought up •-
to ground level. Thus, the effect of this testimony is that, 
if anything, the drains have made Spring Run Creek 
water available earlier in the year. 
Also worthy of note is the fact that the demand let-
ter (which is in evidence) written by respondents' attor-
ney carried the date of May 16 and claimed that respond-
ents would suffer damage "unless water is delivered to 
the property of my clients during this week, * * *. '' Of 
course, May 23rd is within one week of May 16th (~~ 
(R. 425). q~ra: 
As a final observation, it is interesting to note re-
spondents' income tax returns as a general reflection on 
the credibility of their testimony. Their income tax re-
turns show that they operated less land in 1955 than they 
did in 1954 (because the land rented in 1954 wasn't rent-
ed in 1955). Yet, their gross and net income was higher 
in 1955 than it was in 1954. Their tax returns further 
show that their operating expenses were not substantially 
increased. This is of particular interest in light of the 
huge sums which were allegedly spent in pumping water. 
Certainly respondents' income tax returns do not cor-
roborate their claims to much greater operating costs and 
enormous crop damage in 1955. Their explanation of 
variation in crop prices (R. 248-50) is hardly adequate. 
It is believed that the items discussed under Point 
4 clearly demonstrate that the damages awarded by the 
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trial court were excessive, duplicitous, unwarranted, and 
computed by using an erroneous measure. 
PoiNT No. 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST ALL OF THE APPELLANTS. 
The trial court rendered judgment against two cor-
porations and four individuals. This is incredible in 
light of the fact that evidence adduced at the trial wholly 
failed to implicate any of the appellants except Arcon 
Corporation. The evidence showed that defendant Arcon 
Corporation was incorporated before any of the activity 
of which respondents complain was actually commenced. 
Arcon Corporation owned the property whereon the 
ponds were situated and performed the work which re-
spondents contend interfere with their water. Before the 
judgment of the trial court can stand, it must be shown 
that all six of the named appellants were liable to the re-
spondents. Since the judgment has been entered against 
all of the six appellants it must be shown that there 
was evidence before the trial court to justify such 
action. If the record contains any evidence of lia-
bility on behalf of all of the appellants, it is as-
sumed that respondents will point to this evidence 
in their brief. If not, five of these appellants have 
been erroneously held liable to respondents. If this 
Court feels that the trial court's judgment and decree can 
be justified under any possible theory, then it is respect-
fully submitted that such judgment can only be sustained 
against Arcon Corporation, who owned the land and per-
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formed the acts reasonably necesesary to subdivide it for 
residential purposes. The other appellants are entitled 
to a reversal and to their costs. Even if Arcon pays the 
judgment they have a continuing obligation to pump 
water, install pumps, etc., and have had to bring this 
appeal to be relieved of this burden. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that as against all of the 
appellants except Arcon Corporation, there is no evidence 
of any kind to sustain a judgment on any theory. As to 
all of these appellants, the case must be reversed and they 
should be awarded their costs. As to the remaining ap-
pellant, we submit that the judgment should be totally re-
versed, both because we had a right a make a reasonable 
use of (drain) our own land and respondents failed to 
prove any vested interest entitling them to require us to 
maintain ponds. If the court is unable to hold with us on 
these points, then we submit that the matter should be re-
versed to have the quantity of water and the other ele-
ments of the water right fixed with definiteness and cer-
tainty, that we should not, in any event, be compelled to 
pump water for lands which can be irrigated by gravity, 
and that the measure of damages assessed by the trial 
court is in error and should be reYersed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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